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Characteristics of Non-audit Services and
Financial Restatements in Malaysia
Abstract
Various types of purchased non-audit services (NAS) and their recurring nature affect
the likelihood of financial statement restatements in Malaysia. Based on 953 firm-year
observations during the period 2007 to 2009, evidence of a negative relationship
between non-audit fees and financial statement restatements is provided. The purchase
of both tax-related and audit-related NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements.
Recurring (as opposed to non-recurring) tax-related and audit-related NAS are
negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of restatements. These findings
support our hypothesis that both types of NAS and their recurrence provide
knowledge spillover, which enhances audit and financial reporting quality. When
considering institutional settings, we find that politically connected firms are more
likely to require financial restatements than non-politically connected firms, while
audit committee independence and the purchase of tax-related, recurring tax-related
and other NAS decrease this likelihood. The purchase of audit-related and recurring
audit-related NAS and non-recurring other NAS decreases the likelihood of
restatements for non-politically connected firms.
Keywords: Auditor independence, financial restatements, non-audit services,





Malaysia is not without its fair share of accounting scandals. The Maxbiz Corp
Bhd., Transmile Bhd., Megan Media Holdings Bhd. and Tat Sang Bhd. cases signaled
accounting irregularities in Malaysia in 2007.1 These cases indirectly gave a negative
view of the role of auditors in preventing fraud. Transmile Bhd. created some stir  in
the local media, especially with the involvement of a renowned retired political leader
from the governing party who was acting as the chairman of the firm.2 The auditor of
Transmile Bhd., Deloitte & Touche, was accused of failure in detecting accounting
irregularities dating back to 2004, after a special audit was performed by Moores
Rowland Risk Management.3
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the issue of auditor
independence in Malaysia.4 Joint provision of non-audit and audit services by a single
auditor has been the subject of numerous studies, as such provision may undermine
auditor independence as the economic bond with management increases over time
(Francis, 2006). Three research objectives are offered for this study. First, we explore
the relationship between non-audit fees and financial statement restatements. Second,
we examine the impact of various types of non-audit services (NAS) on financial
restatements. Third, we consider whether recurring or non-recurring NAS affect
1 Maxbiz Corp Bhd. defaulted on the redemption of stock loans issued to restructure Geahin
Engineering Bhd., the company that formed Maxbiz. Transmile Bhd. had a false receivables account,
and a market capitalisation of nearly RM 4 billion was reduced to a mere RM 155 million by mid-2007.
Megan Media Bhd. suffered massive collusive fraud and raked up debt to RM 1 billion. In 2007, Tat
Sang Bhd. inflated the value of its assets and was found guilty of giving false information to the stock
exchange for an IPO in 2003.
2 The retired politician is Tun Dr. Ling Liong Sik. He is currently under investigation for the Port
Klang Free Zone scandal, largely due to cost overruns.
3 Deloitte &Touche also audits Mesdaq-listed firms NasionCom Holdings Bhd. and Ocean Capital Bhd.
which were reprimanded in 2007 for submitting inflated revenue figures.
4 DeAngelo (1981a) defines auditor independence as the conditional probability that auditors will both
find and report misrepresentation in financial statements, while Knapp (1985) states that auditor
independence is the ability to resist client pressure. Beattie and Fearnley (2002) argue that these
definitions reflect on two important element of auditor independence: (i) objectivity, which is the
ability to suppress biases, and (ii) integrity, which is the willingness to express an opinion that
truthfully reflects the evaluation of what has been discovered during the audit.
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financial restatements. The incidence of financial restatements is used as a proxy for
financial reporting and audit quality.  Malaysia is an excellent choice to test auditor
independence since the incumbent statutory auditor can provide NAS (unlike the U.S,
for example) and this, in theory, could undermine auditor independence. Furthermore,
the Malaysian audit market has not experienced regulatory reforms like those of the
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), and so provides more opportunity to explore the
impact of NAS on auditor independence.
To test the robustness of results, the following variables previously tested in
Malaysian settings are considered: (1) political connections (Abdul Wahab et al.,
2009; Gul, 2006), (2) institutional investors’ ownership (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009),
(3) Bumiputra directors (Johl et al., 2012) and (4) family firms (Wan-Hussin, 2009).
Our choice of variables fills some gaps regarding institutional settings in an audit
quality study by Francis (2006). In a study of fraudulent financial reporting, Hasnan et
al. (2013) recognize that institutional environments in Malaysia with concentrated
shareholdings by individuals, families, and significant political connections have
substantial implications for the quality of financial reporting.
The subject of NAS and whether they impair auditor independence has been
debated over a number of years. Studies (Beattie & Fearnley, 2002; Francis, 2006;
Schneider et al., 2006; Walker & Hay, 2013) offer contrasting arguments on how
NAS affect auditor independence. The first view is that knowledge spillover from the
provision of NAS makes the audit more efficient; the second view is that these
services indeed undermine auditor independence. Francis (2006) offers two
conjectures  of  why  NAS  are  inherently  problematic  for  auditors.  The  first  is  the
possibility that these services compromise auditors’ judgment as they move from
being an independent outsider to becoming an inside adviser and decision maker; the
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second is the increasing economic bond that develops between client and auditor as
increasing fees develop reliance on NAS.
Past Malaysian studies that have examined auditor independence (Abdul
Wahab et al., 2013; Teoh & Lim, 1996) have failed to take into consideration the
characteristics of NAS. Extant literature demonstrates that the characteristics of both
type and recurrence have different effects on auditor independence.
Like extant literature on the relationship between non-audit fees and financial
restatements (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Kinney et al., 2004; Paterson & Valencia,
2011; Raghunandan et al., 2003), we partition non-audit fees into several groups to
address the point raised by Simunic (1984) that additional insight may be gained by
classifying  NAS  as  specific  types  rather  than  treating  them  as  homogeneous.  We
categorize the NAS into tax-related, audit-related and other NAS. Furthermore, we
classify them as to whether they are recurring in nature or not (Paterson & Valencia,
2011). The view of auditor independence by Schneider et al. (2006) stresses the
importance  of  identifying  the  recurrence  of  NAS  as  this  will  enhance  our
understanding of auditor independence, following the argument raised by Beck et al.
(1988) that recurring NAS contribute to knowledge spillover that improves auditor
independence. In our sample, we consider only incumbent auditors who provide NAS
to clients, acknowledging the concern raised by Palmrose (1986) that there should be
no joint-supply benefits between audit services supplied by the incumbent firm and
NAS supplied by non-incumbent firms.
This study extends the current literature on auditor independence and financial
restatements in Malaysia. Teoh and Lim (1996) provide initial evidence of the
relationship between non-audit fees and auditor independence in Malaysia. Based on
an  experimental  design,  they  find  that  a  large  audit  fee  is  the  single  most  important
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factor leading to impairment of auditor independence, followed by the provision of
management consultancy services. Abdul Wahab et al. (2013) investigate the
relationship between non-audit fees, political connections and going concern audit
opinions. They find no evidence to suggest a relationship between non-audit fees and
going  concern  audit  opinions.  However,  they  find  that  firms  with  high  levels  of
Bumiputra directors are less likely to be issued a going concern audit opinion. Abdul
Wahab and Mat Zain (2013) examine audit fees during auditor changes based on a
large 1996–2006 data base, and find no evidence that the lowballing of audit fees
impairs auditor independence. Abdullah et al. (2010) offer the only published study in
Malaysia that examines the relationship between corporate governance and financial
restatements thus making our study timely. A study by Hasnan et al. (2013) examines
the influence of various institutional and corporate governance factors on fraudulent
financial reporting in Malaysia. While examining the impact of the various types and
recurrence  of  NAS  on  financial  restatements  in  Malaysia,  the  present  study  also
controls for institutional and corporate governance variables.
The literature on earnings management is also extended in the present study.
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) argue that unlike earnings management that firms
routinely engage in at various levels, a misstatement is essentially a direct admission
by managers of past manipulation of earnings. There is no ‘smoking gun’
measurement that indicates earnings have indeed been manipulated (Agrawal &
Chadha, 2005).
Like  Paterson  and  Valencia  (2011),  we  choose  financial  restatements  as  our
measure of financial reporting quality and proxy for auditor independence.5 Users of
financial statements and the capital markets rely on the auditor’s expertise and
5Muniandy and Ali (2012) state that four regulators in Malaysia have the duty to review audited reports.
They are Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), Bursa Malaysia (the local stock exchange),
Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) and Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA).
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independence to ensure that the quality of financial reporting is maintained.
Restatements indicate audit failures (Paterson & Valencia, 2011); therefore, utilizing
financial restatements will allow us to examine auditor independence in a more
meaningful manner.
Based on 953 firm-year observations for the period 2007 to 2009, we find
evidence that the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees affects the likelihood of financial
restatements. Upon partitioning non-audit fees, we find that tax-related and audit-
related NAS are significantly and negatively related to financial restatements.
Likewise, recurring (as opposed to non-recurring) tax-related and audit-related NAS
reduce the likelihood of financial restatements.
These findings are similar to those of Kinney et al. (2004) and Paterson and
Valencia (2011), who suggest that tax-related NAS provide knowledge spillover that
improves audit quality and auditor independence. Specifically, Kinney et al. (2004)
find that large public companies that pay highly for tax services from their auditors
tend to have fewer restatements than large public companies that pay less; and
Paterson and Valencia (2011) find a significant negative relationship between auditor-
provided recurring tax services and financial restatements. Our analysis, too, shows an
increase in the likelihood of financial restatements by politically connected firms,
which suggests that these firms carry more risk (Gul, 2006) and are deemed to be
inefficient  (Johnson  &  Mitton,  2003)  in  terms  of  operational  activities.  Extended
analysis of politically connected firms indicate that non-audit fees, tax-related non-
audit fees, recurring non-audit fees and recurring tax-related non-audit fees are
negatively and significantly related to financial restatements. This suggests that
knowledge spillover exists for NAS purchased by politically connected firms. Thus,
the  purchase  of  NAS  by  politically  connected  firms  may  be  seen  as  a  means  to
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overcome inefficiency, as indicated by Johnson and Mitton (2003), and lower inherent
risk, as suggested by Gul (2006), thereby reducing the incidence of restatements. Our
findings also show that the purchase of certain NAS (audit-related, recurring non-
audit fees and recurring audit-related) by non-politically connected firms decreases
the likelihood of restatements.
Section 2 of this study details a brief institutional background of the Malaysian
capital and audit markets. Section 2 also provides a discussion on the development of
corporate governance in Malaysia. Section 3 presents the rationale for our developed
hypotheses while Section 4 describes the sample selection process. Section 5
discusses the research methodology for this paper. Section 6 presents the results and
Section 7 provides an extension to our primary analysis to demonstrate robustness.
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Institutional Background
2.1 Development of Capital Market
The capital market in Malaysia began with the establishment of the New
Economic Policy (NEP) of 1971. This economic policy emphasized the balance of
wealth among various ethnic groups, especially between the dominant Malays
(henceforth Bumiputras) and the Chinese who then controlled the economy (Gomez &
Jomo, 1999). The NEP has made some progress although it is still subject to issues
such as cronyism (Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Gul, 2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Salim,
2006), weak professional development (Salim, 2006) and poor management control in
terms of executing government contracts (Hamid, 2008). Gomez and Jomo (1999) in
their seminal work describe this as positive discrimination, as the NEP was
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established  to  assist  the  Bumiputras,  and  especially  to  increase  their  share  of  the
capital market. 6
Malaysia is well known for its relationship-based economy. This is seen from
one angle as cronyism, but from another perspective is a means to spark business
interest among the Bumiputras and reduce the wealth imbalance among ethnic
groups.7 Faccio et al. (2006) find that Malaysia has among the highest number of
politically connected firms relative to the size of its capital market, at nearly 20
percent (see Johnson & Mitton, 2003 for a list of politically connected firms). In
addition, the Malaysian capital market is plagued with highly levered firms (Bliss &
Gul, 2012a, 2012b; Fraser et al., 2006), is highly dependent on various governance
codes (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007), has weak enforcement of investor protection, has
concentrated ownership (Claessens et al., 2000) and family firms (Wan-Hussin,
2009).
2.2 Audit Market in Malaysia
The audit market in Malaysia has seen some major changes since the period of
independence.8 In 1968 the Malaysia Institute of Accountants (MIA) was formed, but
its role was minimal until the Investigation and Disciplinary Committee initiated the
MIA’s Code of Ethics in 1990. Now the audit profession is governed by the MIA By-
laws  and  the  Bursa  Malaysia  Listing  Rules  and  Companies  Act  of  1965.  The  Big  4
6 White (2004) provides an excellent study of crony capitalism in Malaysia prior to NEP of 1971. The
reason for the development of crony capitalism, especially between Chinese businessmen and
Bumiputra politicians, was to gain concessions, licences, monopoly rights and government subsidies,
and to get protection from foreign competition.
7 There have been some high-profile (on-going) cases highlighting the result of (possible) cronyism.
One  is  the  National  Feedlot  Corporation  (NFC)  which  is  run  by  a  company  associated  with  the  then
Minister of Women, Family and Community Development and current Chair of UMNO’s Women
Wing. The RM 250 million allocated for the business by the government has been subject to scrutiny as
the company bought assets such as condominiums in Singapore. The entire family of the Minister sits
on the board of directors. This case is currently being investigated and the NFC is suspended. UMNO,
the United Malays National Organization, is the dominant political party.
8 See Ali et al. (2006) for a review of the development of audit market in Malaysia.
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auditors provide audit services to nearly 70 percent of the Bursa Malaysia firms (see
Abdul Wahab et al., 2009; Gul, 2006), and mid-tier firms such as BDO Seidman,
Grant Thornton and Laventhol & Horwath operate in the local audit market. Among
the mechanisms in place to mitigate possible independence issues is audit partner
rotation, stipulated by the MIA By-laws; the Listing Rules state that the listed firms
need to disclose the amount of NAS purchased. However, the rules and regulations do
not require disclosure of the NAS provider, which suggests that incumbent statutory
auditors could provide NAS.
The MIA By-laws define independence as independence of mind and
independence in appearance (MIA By-laws definitions, paragraph XXXI). This
suggests that the auditor’s conclusion or opinion in a financial statement audit must
not be influenced in a manner that may compromise professional judgment or impair
third party judgment about the auditor’s professional responsibility.
The MIA By-laws on professional conduct and ethics (revised 2002) suggest
that  audit  firms  should  not  accept  any  appointment  if  they  are  providing  NAS  to  a
client,  whereby  the  provision  of  NAS would  create  a  significant  threat  to  the  firm’s
professional independence, integrity and objectivity; but unlike the US Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002) rules, there is no specific prohibition on providing certain types of
non-audit or non-assurance services to the client. 9  The revised MIA By-laws
(paragraph 290.156 to 290.161) explain the ethical rules and guidelines pertaining to
providing non-assurance services to audit clients; these rules clearly allow auditors to
9  Specifically, Section 201(a) of Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) adds Section 10A(g) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 10A(g) prohibits a registered public accounting firm from
providing certain NAS to their audit clients, including the following: (a) bookkeeping or other services
related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; (b) financial information
systems design and implementation; (c) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or
contribution-in-kind reports; (d) actuarial services; (e) internal audit outsourcing services; (f)
management functions or human resources; (g) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment
banking services; (h) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and (i) any other service
that may be determined to be impermissible (Seetharaman et al., 2011).
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provide NAS to audit clients at a level that might not be deemed to compromise
independence.10
2.3 Corporate Governance in Malaysia
Corporate governance forms an important part of the capital market framework
in Malaysia, and was especially important during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998.
The establishment of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2000
as part of the stock exchange listing requirements marked an important milestone for
corporate reporting requirements. The MCCG went through a revision in 2007 that
focused on the qualifications of appointed directors by specifying candidates who had
skills, knowledge, expertise, experience, professionalism and integrity, and stressed
both the need to document properly all assessments and evaluations carried out by the
nominating committee in the discharge of its functions and the need to provide greater
disclosure of the issues discussed in board meetings. The revised MCCG emphasized
that all members of the audit committee should be financially literate and at least one
should be a member of an accounting association or body. In 2007, MCCG required
all  firms  to  have  an  internal  audit  function.  The  Listing  Requirements  of  Bursa
Malaysia mandate disclosure of whether the internal audit function is performed in-
house or is outsourced, and of the costs incurred for the internal audit function in the
financial year (Wan-Hussin & Mohammed Bamahros, 2013).
The amendment in 2007 specifies that all members of the audit committee should
be non-executive directors. The revised MCCG also requires the audit committee to
engage on a continuous basis with senior management, including the chairperson, the
10 Para 290.158 of the MIA By-laws states, “before the firm accepts an engagement to provide a non-
assurance service to an audit client, a determination shall be made as to whether providing such a
service would create a threat to independence. In evaluating the significance of any threat created by a
particular non-assurance service, consideration shall be given to any threat that the audit team has
reason to believe is created by providing other related non-assurance services. If a threat is created that
cannot be reduced to an acceptable level by the application of safeguards, the non-assurance service
shall not be provided.”
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chief executive officer, the finance director, the head of internal audit and the external
auditors. It extends firms’ disclosure responsibilities by requiring listed companies to
provide more disclosure on (1) matters discussed in the Board and audit committee’s
meetings, (2) assessments and evaluations carried out by the nominating committee in
the discharge of all its functions, and (3) directors’ relevant training.
3. Research Hypotheses
The primary role of the external auditor is to provide certification and credibility
of the financial statements (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Fan & Wong, 2005). However,
over the last several decades a substantial and increasing portion of accounting firms’
total revenues have been derived from consulting services of various kinds. Provision
of these NAS can potentially hurt the quality of an audit by impairing auditor
independence because of the economic bond that is created between the auditor and
the client (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005).
Kinney et al. (2004) offer three reasons for a negative relationship between
NAS and the likelihood of financial restatements. The first is the subject of
knowledge spillover as the NAS provides improved audit effectiveness. For instance,
knowledge of a client’s computer system or tax accounting could spill over to the
audit, enhancing the quality of financial reporting (Kinney et al., 2004). Second, as an
analytical model by Dopuch et al. (2003) suggests, for clients with high quality
financial reporting and low ex ante misstatement risk, the NAS provided by the audit
firm may increase the audit firm’s reputation capital. This reputation capital, in turn,
increases the incentives for audit thoroughness and independence in audit reporting
decisions. Third, clients with high quality financial reporting may seek more expert
computer system and tax advice, internal audits and other audit-related services, and
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may choose their own audit firm as the preferred supplier of such services either
because  of  quality  or  cost.  Any  of  these  reasons  suggests  a  negative  relationship
between NAS fees and the likelihood of financial restatements.
The economic dependence or bonding argument (Francis, 2006; Kinney et al.,
2004) suggests that there is a positive relationship between NAS and the likelihood of
financial restatements. A dependence on lucrative NAS fees which increases over
time may reduce the auditor’s willingness to challenge possible misstatements in a
client’s financial records and may reduce the likelihood of the auditor detecting
misstatements. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) suggest that provision of NAS potentially
hurts the quality of audits by impairing auditor independence due to the increase in
economic bonding.
We predict a negative relationship between the provision of NAS and the
likelihood of financial statement restatements because we believe that auditors’
concerns for loss of reputation and exposure to litigation will constrain any desire
created by dependence or economic bonding with the client to subordinate their
professional judgment to management’s wishes. In other words, a more thorough
understanding or a more holistic view of the financial reporting system will be
achieved when NAS are provided, and is more likely than not to result in knowledge
spillover benefits that enhance audit and financial reporting quality. We also expect
that because of the nature of the different categories of NAS, examining the different
types of NAS individually will provide more meaningful insights into the differential
effects on audit effectiveness and auditor independence. Reviews of cumulative
research and meta-analysis to date (Habib, 2012; Lim & Tan 2008) conclude that
there is evidence based on capital market studies that investors perceive that  NAS
impair independence (i.e., in appearance), but evidence that the provision of NAS
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impairs “independence in fact” is weak or non-existent. The first primary hypothesis
tested is as follows:
Hypothesis 1(H1): There is a negative relationship between specific types of
NAS fees and financial restatements.
Raghunandan et al. (2003) find no evidence to suggest that either NAS fees or
total fees inappropriately influences the audit and leads to restatements for 110 US
firms during 2000–2001. Similarly, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find no significant
relationship between non-audit fees and financial restatements for 159 US firms that
restated their accounts during the 2000–2001 period. Based on 250 US firms that
restate their accounts during 2001–2002, obtained from the GAO database,
Bloomfield and Shackman (2008) find limited evidence to suggest that firms with
higher NAS fees are more likely to restate earnings; they also find a positive and
significant relationship between total fees and the probability of financial statement
restatements. Huang et al. (2007) investigate types of non-audit fees and financial
reporting quality. Based on a discretionary accrual model, they find no evidence to
suggest that types of non-audit fees affect the quality of financial reporting.
Like Alexander and Hay (2013), Kinney et al. (2004) and Paterson and
Valencia (2011), we examine the association between types of NAS and financial
restatements. The different types of NAS may have different impacts on auditor
independence. For instance, the most common auditor-provided NAS is the
completion of annual tax returns, and tax compliance services are frequently
described as generating knowledge spillover that improves audit effectiveness,
increasing auditor independence (Francis, 2006). We expect that certain types of NAS
  
15
will have different effects on the probability of financial statement restatements.
Knechel and Payne (2001) and Knechel and Sharma (2012) examine the association
between types of NAS and audit lag, where audit lag acts as a proxy for auditor
independence. Knechel and Payne (2001) examine both management advisory
services (MAS) and tax NAS against audit report lag. They find that audit report lag is
decreased by the mix of MAS and audit services. Knechel and Sharma (2012)
extended the study by examining types of NAS (tax and non-tax fees) against audit
report lag before and after establishment of Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). They
find that tax services are significantly and negatively related to audit report lag.
Based on a larger sample of 432 restating US firms between 1995 and 2000,
Kinney et al. (2004) investigate the relationship between various types of non-audit
fees and financial restatements. They divide NAS into five categories: financial
information systems design and implementation, internal audit, audit-related, tax, and
unspecified fees. They find a negative and significant relationship between auditor-
provided tax services and restatements, but a positive relationship between
unspecified fees and restatements, which suggests that auditor-provided tax services
increase auditor independence while unspecified fees have the opposite effect.
Seetharaman et al. (2011) examine the relationship between auditor-provided tax
services and tax-related financial statement restatements. Using a sample of 3,888 US
restated firm-years during 2003–2005 for 2116 distinct firms, they find no significant
association between auditor-provided tax services and general financial statement
restatements, but do find a significantly negative relationship between auditor-
provided tax services and tax-related financial statement restatements.
An important additional consideration is whether certain NAS are recurring.
Beck et al. (1988) and Schneider et al. (2006) argue that recurring NAS is an
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important factor in determining auditor independence. Beck et al. (1988) suggest that
recurring NAS engagements are expected to generate knowledge spillover that
increases audit quality. Chung and Kallapur (2003) suggest that some NAS result in
economies of scope and generate cost savings. If such cost savings are shared with the
client the auditor’s economic bond is decreased. The second primary hypothesis tested
is as follows:
Hypothesis 2(H2): There is a negative relationship between specific types of
recurring NAS fees and financial restatements.
Paterson and Valencia (2011) extend the work of Kinney et al. (2004) by
investigating the impact of recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees on financial
restatements. Based on 3,232 restated firm-years in the U.S during 2003–2006, they
find a significant negative relationship between auditor-provided recurring tax
services and financial restatements. This is consistent with recurring tax services
generating knowledge spillover that improves audit quality. Alexander and Hay
(2013) find no significant relationship between recurring NAS fees and restatements
for a 643 firm-years sample of New Zealand firms between 1995 and 2001. Given
such findings and our partitioning of NAS into components, we predict a negative
relationship between recurring NAS and the likelihood of financial restatements.
4. Sample Selection
The  sample  consists  of  Bursa  Malaysia’s  listed  firms  from  2007  to  2009,  as
presented in Table 1. Consistent with other studies, financial firms are excluded from
the sample. The data for NAS were hand collected from annual reports downloaded
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from Bursa Malaysia’s website. Other hand-collected data from downloaded annual
reports are institutional and corporate governance variables. Firm financial
characteristics were extracted from Compustat Global. Financial restatements data
were obtained from Datastream, and the classification of the types of restatements was
derived from the annual reports. Since we are interested in examining the effect of
NAS provided by the incumbent auditor on independence, non-incumbent auditors
that provide NAS to the client are excluded from the sample.11 This process results in
953 firm-year observations during 2007–2009.
{Table 1}
5. Research Method
The following probit model is posited:
RESTATE (0,1) = a0INTERCEPTit + a1NAFit + a2BUMIit + a3INSTOWNit +
a4POLCONit +a5FAMILYit +a6INT_AUDITit + a7AUDCOMit + a8BOD_EXPERTit +
a9ASSETSit + a10DEBT_EQUITYit + a11NEG_EQUITYit + a12LOSSit + A13BIG_4it +
a14INDUSTRIESit +A15PERIODSit+ eit
5.1 Dependent Variable
Financial statement restatements (RESTATE) is a dummy variable which takes
on the value of 1 if the firm issued a restatement of accounts, and zero otherwise. We
classified the financial restatements into several categories based on a review of the
annual  reports.  As  in  Paterson  and  Valencia  (2011),  restatements  are  categorized  as
accounting rule application failures (RESTATE_AR), misrepresentation
11 The results after the inclusion of 36 non-incumbent auditors remain statistically similar.
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(RESTATE_M)  and irregularities (RESTATE_I).12 All variables are listed and defined
in Table 2.
5.2 Independent Test Variables
The primary independent variable for this study is NAS. Similar to studies
(Bloomfield & Shackman, 2008; Huang et al., 2007; Kinney et al., 2004;
Seetharaman et al. 2011), non-audit fees deflated by total fees (NAF) is our measure
for NAS. Non-audit fees are segregated into several types, deflated by total fees which
are tax-related NAS (TAX), audit-related NAS (AUDREL) and other NAS (OTHERS).
Like Paterson and Valencia (2011), we examine recurring (NAF_REC) and non-
recurring  NAS  (NAF_NREC),  recurring  (TAX_REC) and non-recurring tax-related
NAS (TAX_NREC), recurring (AUDREL_REC) and non-recurring audit-related NAS
(AUDREL_NREC), and recurring (OTHERS_REC) and non-recurring other NAS
(OTHERS_NREC). Also like them, we use consecutive periods to determine whether
the fees for each type of NAS are recurring or non-recurring. 13
5.3 Independent Institutional Variables
We consider several institutional variables that are representative of the
Malaysian capital market. The first is political connections. Politically connected
firms form an important mechanism in Bursa Malaysia. Studies (Gomez & Jomo,
1999; Salim, 2006) suggest that Malaysia presents an interesting example of political
development as it is based, historically, on ethnicity. Salim (2006) argues that not
12 An example of accounting rule application failure is when A&M Realty Bhd. in 2007 was required to
restate its accounts after taking into consideration bonus issues. In 2009, A&M Realty was required to
restate its accounts to conform with the current year’s financial presentation; this is an example of
misrepresentation. An example of irregularity is Ann Joo Bhd. which in 2009 restated accounts due to
treatment of discontinued operations in financial statements (see Appendix B). A mistake implies
unintentional error, whereas irregularities do not. Irregularities may refer to intentional misstatements
as in the case of fraud.
13 Since three years of data are used, we do not consider non-audit fees of similar type that firms
purchased in 2007 and then again in 2009 as recurring. The reason for this pattern might be that a
different type of NAS was purchased in 2008; or it is possible the data were unavailable in 2008.
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only the political economy and capital market, but also the constitution, is largely
influenced by racial diversity. Seminal work by Johnson and Mitton (2003) finds that
capital control assisted politically connected firms to gain efficiency during the Asian
Financial Crisis.
Gul (2006) suggests that auditors will assess politically connected firms as
riskier relative to non-politically connected firms and thus result in higher audit fees.
Bliss et al. (2011) examine whether political connections affect the association of two
governance constructs; independent audit committee and CEO duality and the demand
for higher quality audits. They find that political connections weakens the demand for
higher quality audits by a more independent audit committee. Further, Bliss et al.
(2011) find that audit firms perceived politically-connected firms with CEO duality as
riskier.
A later study by Abdul Wahab et al. (2013) finds similar results: they examine
the relationship between politically connected firms and the propensity to receive a
going concern audit opinion. They find a negative relationship between the proportion
of Bumiputra directors, a proxy for political connections, and going concern audit
opinions. Hasnan et al. (2013) argue that political connection is one of the motivations
for fraudulent financial reporting. They argue that quality of earnings may not be
salient for politically connected firms since these firms derive gains for their
connections. This argument is supported by Riahi-Belkaui (2004), who indicates that
gains derived from political connectedness are subject to uncertainty; politically
connected firms are able to camouflage their earnings and avoid public scrutiny
(Hasnan et al., 2013).
Because of the possibility of political interference, and the risk of future
default by these firms that could result in a collapse of the market and of political
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protection, we predict a positive relationship between political connections and the
likelihood of financial restatements. Political connectedness (POLCON) is
operationalized as an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is
politically connected, and zero otherwise. The lists of politically connected firms
gathered by Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Khazanah Nasional Berhad are used.14
Our second independent institutional variable is the proportion of Bumiputra
directors on the board (BUMI).15 Earlier studies such as those of Haniffa and Cooke
(2002, 2005) and Yatim et al. (2006) include Bumiputra directors as part of their
framework when investigating the relationship between culture, disclosure and audit
fees. More recent studies such as Abdul Rahman and Mohammad Ali (2006), Salleh
et al. (2006), Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) and Syed Mustapha Nazri et al. (2012)
investigate the effect of culture on earnings management, audit quality, corporate
governance and auditor choice respectively. As do these studies, the Hofstede-Gray
framework was used to establish the relationship between ethnicity and the likelihood
of financial restatements. Based on this framework, Haniffa and Cooke (2002, 2005)
argue that Bumiputra directors are more secretive in terms of disclosure, relative to
the other (Chinese) ethnic group. Their weak accounting disclosures could lead to
more audit effort and thus to possible misstatements. Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) and
Johl et al. (2012) offer a similar argument from the viewpoint of political
development in Malaysia. They argue that Bumiputra directors tend to be more
politically connected and open for cronyism. These firms might not have the
14 Khazanah Nasional Berhad is a Malaysian sovereign wealth fund. It is the investment holding arm of
the Government of Malaysia entrusted to hold and manage the commercial assets of the government
and to undertake strategic investments. Khazanah was incorporated under the Companies Act 1965 on
3 September 1993 as a public limited company. The share capital of Khazanah is administered by the
Minister of Finance, a body corporate incorporated pursuant to the Minister of Finance (Incorporation)
Act, 1957.
15Bumiputra is a Malaysian term to describe the Malay race and indigenous people of Southeast Asia,
particularly in Malaysia. The term comes from the Sanskrit word bhumiputra, which can be translated
literally as “son of the land” or “son of the soil” (bhumi= earth or land, putra=son).
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motivation to produce good or sound financial reporting as they are supported by the
government (Faccio et al., 2006); therefore we predict a positive relationship between
the proportion of Bumiputra directors and the likelihood of financial restatements.
The third institutional variable is family firms (FAMILY). We operationalize
family firms as the proportion of family members on the board of directors. Empirical
evidence on family firms in Malaysia is rather limited. Claessens et al. (2000) provide
initial support on family firms in Malaysia, arguing that firms are controlled by
related parties and are owner-managed. Wan-Hussin (2009) examines the relationship
between family firms and segment disclosures in Malaysia. He argues that differences
in the type I agency problem overwhelm the differences in the type II agency problem
between family and non-family firms. 16  Wan-Hussin (2009) observes that family
firms have higher disclosure quality, measured by the likelihood of early adoption for
segment disclosures in Malaysia. Wang (2006) finds a positive relationship between
founding family ownership and quality of earnings. Hasnan et al. (2013) find that
family ownership is negatively and significantly associated with fraudulent financial
reporting. Based on this discussion, a negative relationship between the proportion of
family members on the board of directors and financial restatements is predicted.
The fourth and final institutional variable is institutional ownership
(INSTOWN). The role of institutional investors in Malaysia has increased significantly
since the Asian Financial Crisis. A negative relationship between institutional
ownership and the likelihood of financial restatements is predicted, as institutional
investors are expected to play a more active governance role by either demanding
better due professional care from auditors or playing a monitoring role to the board of
directors and management. Based on the Malaysian government’s initiative in setting
16Type I agency cost refers to manager opportunism or misalignment effects while the Type II agency
cost is owner opportunism or entrenchment effects.
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up the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) to protect minority
shareholders’ interests, institutional shareholders have more initiative to take a
governance role and enhance audit quality. Abdul Wahab et al. (2007, 2009) and
Ammer and Abdul Rahman (2009) present evidence that institutional investors in
Malaysia do play an active role in terms of monitoring management. Abdul Wahab et
al. (2007) examine the relationship between institutional investors and corporate
governance in which they find a positive and significant association. Abdul Wahab et
al. (2009) find a negative relationship between institutional ownership and audit fees,
and a significant and negative relationship between political connections and audit
fees. Ammer and Abdul Rahman (2009) find significant price reactions for firms
targeted by institutional investors.
5.4 Independent Corporate Governance Variables
In the spirit of Agrawal and Chadha (2005), several corporate governance
variables  are  considered.  First  we  include  the  level  of  independence  of  audit
committee members (AUDCOM), which is the proportion of independent directors on
the audit committee. Abbott et al. (2004) offer two explanations of how independence
affects or reduces the likelihood of financial restatements. First, the independence and
effectiveness of the internal audit function is strengthened when internal auditors
report to an audit committee that does not include a current or former member of
management; and second, the audit committee will demand greater external audit
scope to avoid being associated with financial restatements. In these situations, the
likelihood that the external auditor detects material misstatement is increased (Abbott
et al., 2003); hence, we predict a negative relationship between the level of audit
committee independence and financial restatements, as was found by Abbott et al.
  
23
(2004). Baber et al. (2012) include the level of independence of audit committee in
constructing their measure of internal governance, the B-index17, finding a negative
relationship between the B-index and financial restatements. Rainsbury et al. (2009)
examine the relationship between audit committee quality on financial reporting
quality and audit fees in New Zealand. Presented with a unique dataset of voluntary
formation of audit committee, they find no significant association between the quality
of audit committee and the quality of financial reporting quality and little impact on
audit fees.18
The second corporate governance variable is whether the internal audit
function is outsourced.19 We include an indicator variable, (INT_AUDIT), which takes
on the value of 1 if the firm outsources the internal audit function, and zero otherwise.
A negative relationship between internal audit outsourcing and financial restatements
is expected. We argue that an outsourced internal audit function will increase the level
of monitoring and require a higher level of monitoring from the external auditor, and
as such will decrease the likelihood of financial restatements, because while internal
auditors report to the highest levels of management (and BOD), they still have an
economic interest in the viability of the organization and are not independent with
respect to it. When the internal audit function is outsourced, there is greater scrutiny
because the external auditor has to concern itself with the reliability of the outsourced
17 The B-index is a composite measure of six board characteristics:
(i) Fraction of independent directors on the board
(ii) Fraction of independent directors on the audit committee
(iii) Fraction of independent directors on the compensation committee
(iv) Faction of independent directors on the nominating committee
(v) Number of board members
(vi) CEO duality
18 Rainsbury et al. (2009) identified three membership variables of audit committee. These are:
(i) Best practice audit committee
(ii) Audit committee independence
(iii) Accounting expertise in audit committee
19 We do not consider internal audit as a non-audit service since it is predominantly provided by non-




organization. Wan-Hussin and Mohammed Bamahros (2013) argue that the role of
internal audit function reduces the information asymmetry between managers and
various stakeholders. Extant literature on this relationship finds a positive relationship
between the internal audit function and audit fees (see Hay et al., 2008; Mohammed et
al., 2012). Wan-Hussin and Mohammed Bamahros (2013) find a negative relationship
between the cost of internal audit function and audit report delay, but find no similar
result when the internal audit function is either outsourced to another party or
insourced within the firm.
The third corporate governance variable, (BOD_EXPERT), is the proportion of
accounting and finance experts on the board of directors. We predict a negative
relationship between BOD_EXPERT and the likelihood of financial restatements. Aier
et al. (2005) find a negative relationship between chief financial officers who have
financial knowledge and financial restatements.
5.5 Independent Control Variables
Several control variables established in previous studies of financial
restatements are included in the model. The natural log transformation of total assets
(ASSETS) is used to control for client size. A leverage variable is used to control for
default risk among sample firms. Leverage is operationalized as total debt scaled by
total  equity  (DEBT_EQUITY). As in Bliss and Gul (2012a, b), a dummy variable,
(NEG_EQUITY), takes on a value of 1 if the firm reports a negative equity, and zero
otherwise.  It  is  believed  that  the  inclusion  of  firms  with  negative  equity  will  give  a
broader view of Malaysia’s capital market.20
20 Bliss and Gul (2012a, b) argue that the exclusion of negative equity firms might not reflect the true
nature of the Malaysian capital market, especially as the high proportion of politically connected firms
that experience negative equity would still be allowed to trade on Bursa Malaysia.
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An  indicator  variable  for  a  Big  4  auditor  (BIG_4) controls for audit quality,
which may affect the likelihood of restatements. We include a dummy variable
(LOSS), which takes on the value of 1 if the firm reports negative earnings during the
year, and zero otherwise. Finally, industry and year dummies are included in the
model to control the effects of these factors.21
{Table 2}
5.6 Data Description
Total observations during the sample period (2007–2009) are 953. Tables 3 and
3a present the distribution of restatements during the sample period and the
distribution of types of restatements, respectively. There are a total of 98 (10.28
percent of total observations) restatements during the sample period: 38 (38.78
percent) occurred during 2007, 7 (7.14 percent) in 2008, and 53 (54.08 percent) in
2009. With respect to yearly distribution, there are 438 observations (restatements and
non-restatements) for 2007, 298 for 2008, and 217 for 2009.
{Table 3}
As shown in Table 3a, restatements arising from accounting rules application
failure, Restate_AR, represent 30.61 percent (30) of total financial restatements across
the three-year period, while restatements arising from accounting irregularities,
(Restate_I), account for 17.35 percent (17) and restatements due to
misrepresentations, (Restate_M), account for 52.04 percent (51).22 Tables 3 and 3a
show that most of the restatements occurred in 2009.
21 For the sake of brevity, we do not disclose the results of period and industry dummies. Results are
available from the corresponding author.




Table 4 reports variable means, medians and p-values for differences in means
and medians between restatement and non-restatement observations. Panel A of Table
4 reports the results for independent test variables. There are significant median
differences for OTHERS_REC_RM and OTHERS_REC.  Panel B of Table 4 presents
the results for institutional variables. We find a significant difference for politically
connected firms (POLCON) as these firms have significantly higher incidence of
financial restatements. This gives preliminary support for the proposition that a
positive relationship exists between POLCON and restatements. However, there are
no significant differences between restatement and non-restatement firms for the
remaining institutional variables. Panel C presents the differences in means and
medians for corporate governance variables, while Panel D presents the results for
control variables. No significant differences between restatement and non-restatement
firms are observed for corporate governance and control variables.
{Table 4}
In Table 5, the analysis is extended by examining the differences in mean and
median for non-audit fees, audit fees and various firm characteristics among different
types of financial restatements. Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for non-audit
fees, and reveals significant median differences for TAX_NREC_RM and non-
recurring tax-related non-audit fees scaled by total fees (TAX_NREC). We also find
marginally significant median differences for audit-related non-audit fees deflated by
total fees (AUDREL), OTHERS_REC_RM and OTHERS_REC.  There  is  also  a
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marginally significant difference for POLCON among the different types of financial
restatements, as reported in Panel B of Table 5.
                                                           {Table 5}
6. Results
6.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 6 presents both Pearson and Spearman-rank correlations between
variables in this study. The correlations between RESTATE and NAF are -0.074
(Pearson) and -0.064 (Spearman-rank), both significant at the 0.05 level, giving
preliminary support to the hypothesis that the purchase of NAS provides knowledge
spillover that reduces the likelihood of financial restatements. The correlations
between RESTATE and POLCON are positive and significant for both Pearson (0.071)
and Spearman-rank (0.071), giving initial support to the premise that politically
connected firms have a higher likelihood of restatements than non-politically
connected firms. The highest correlation reported is the Spearman-rank between
AUDREL and OTHERS at -0.737, which is significant at the 0.01 level. The Pearson
correlation between AUDREL and OTHERS is only -0.352, and between
DEBT_EQUITY and NEG_EQUITY is -0.497, both significant at the 0.01 level. These
findings suggest that firms are likely to purchase a particular type of NAS and firms
with negative equity are driven by low level of debt to equity ratio.   Other
correlations between independent variables are relatively low and do not appear to




Table 7 presents the results for differences in variable mean and median
among different types of non-audit fees, that is, TAX, AUDREL and OTHERS. In
Panel A, we observe significant differences across these three for RESTATE (the
incidence of financial restatements), NAF_RM, AF_RM, TF_RM, NAF_REC_RM and
NAF_NREC_RM.  A  similar  result  is  observed  for  recurring  (NAF_REC) non-audit
fees deflated by total fees. This indicates that restatements as well as amounts
invested on audit fees and recurring or non-recurring non-audit fees are affected by
the types of non-audit services purchased. Panel B shows significant differences for
institutional variables, indicating variation in the types of NAS due to BUMI,
INSTOWN, POLCON and FAMILY. Additionally, significant differences are observed
for the three corporate governance variables INT_AUDIT, AUDCOM and
BOD_EXPERT among the various types of NAS purchased, as tabulated in panel C.
There are also significant differences for control variables, with the exception of
DEBT_EQUITY. Thus, it appears that the incidence of financial restatements is
associated with the specific types of purchased NAS, and that in order to reduce the
likelihood of an omitted variable problem – institutional, corporate governance and
other control variables influencing restatements will need to be considered in a well-
specified (i.e., parsimonious) model of financial statement restatements.
{Table 7}
Table 8 tabulates the results for differences in variable mean and median
between firms that purchased recurring and non-recurring NAS. We find that firms
purchasing recurring NAS paid significantly higher audit fees (AF_RM) and total fees
(TF_RM) relative to firms purchasing non-recurring NAS. In addition, there are
significant mean differences between recurring and non-recurring firms for tax-related
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(TAX_RM) and other (OTHERS_RM) NAS, while a significant median difference for
audit- related (AUDREL_RM) NAS.
{Table 8}
6.2 Multivariate Analysis
Table 9 tabulates the probit regression results for different types of non-audit
fees. Columns 1 and 2 show results of testing NAF and various types of NAF (TAX,
AUDREL and OTHERS).  Non-audit  fees  deflated  by  total  fees  (NAF) is negatively
and significantly related to the likelihood of financial restatements (-0.713, z=-2.051,
p<0.05).  Analysis  of  types  of  NAF  in  Column  2  of  Table  9  indicates  that  tax  fees
deflated by total fees (TAX) is negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of
financial restatements (-1.370, z=-1.754, p<0.05). This finding supports the notion
that tax-related NAS provide valuable knowledge spillover to the incumbent auditor
with respect to understanding the firm better, and leads to better audit quality. This
result  is  consistent  with  Kinney et al. (2004), Paterson and Valencia (2011) and
Seetharaman et al. (2004). Similar to the finding for TAX, there is a negative and
significant relationship between AUDREL and RESTATE (-0.840, z=-1.622, p<0.10),
suggesting that audit-related NAS also provide knowledge spillover and thus decrease
the frequency of financial restatements.
We find a significantly positive relationship between POLCON and RESTATE,
as shown in column 1 (0.265, z=2.124, p<0.05) and column 2 (0.277, z=2.218,
p<0.05),  supporting  the  argument  that  politically  connected  firms  carry  more  risk
(Gul, 2006) and are driven by inefficiency (Johnson & Mitton, 2003), which could
lead to misstatements. However, we find no evidence to support a significant
relationship for the remaining three institutional variables.
  
30
The regressions also indicate that firms with a higher level of audit committee
independence (AUDCOM) have a lower likelihood of restating their financial
statements, as shown in column 1 (-.007, z=-1.785, p<0.05) and column 2 (-0.007, z=
-1.746, p< 0.05). This supports the argument raised by Abbott et al. (2004) and Baber
et al.  (2012)  that  the  role  of  the  audit  committee  is  crucial  in  demanding  better
monitoring from the external audit to ensure good and sound financial reporting.
{Table 9}
Next,  we  examine  whether  recurring  or  non-recurring  non-audit  fees  have  an
impact on financial restatements. Column 1 of Table 10 reports that recurring NAS
(NAF_REC) are significantly related to financial restatements (-0.755, z=-1.933,
p<0.05). This negative relationship supports the argument raised by Beck et al.
(1988) that recurring NAS contribute to knowledge spillover and improve auditor
independence; this finding is also consistent with Paterson and Valencia (2011).
Results  shown  in  column  2  of  Table  10  document  that  recurring  tax-related
non-audit fees (TAX_REC) have a significant and negative relationship to financial
restatements (-1.443, z=-1.453, p<0.10).  A similar  result  is  reported  in  column 5  of
Table 10 for TAX_REC (-1.779, z=-1.674, p<0.05).  Likewise,  Column  5  (which
includes all components of non-audit fees and their recurring nature) of Table 10 also
shows that recurring audit-related non-audit fees (AUDREL_REC) are negatively and
significantly related to the likelihood of financial restatements (-0.957, z=-1.512,
p<0.10). These findings suggest that the recurrence of tax-related and audit-related
NAS provides some form of audit quality enhancement by reducing the likelihood of
financial restatements. Our findings support the argument raised by Beck et al. (1988)
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and Paterson and Valencia (2011) that recurring NAS provide knowledge spillover
that enhances audit effectiveness. POLCON and AUDCOM are significant and in the
expected direction in Table 10 models just as in Table 9 models.
{Table 10}
7. Further Analysis
7.1 Politically Connected vs. Non-politically Connected Firms
Political connections have been an important determinant in the development of
Malaysia’s capital market. The literature (see Abdul Wahab et al., 2007, 2009; Gul,
2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003) emphasizes the importance of investigating its effect
in the audit setting. Politically connected firms are known to be highly levered, low in
transparency (Faccio et al., 2006), inefficient (Johnson & Mitton, 2003), and high in
inherent risk (Gul, 2006); they seem to remain in trading even with negative equity
(Bliss & Gul, 2012a, b).
The univariate analysis in Appendix A shows that politically connected firms
have significantly higher incidences of financial restatements, non-audit fees (median
differences), audit fees and total fees than non-politically connected firms. There are
significant differences for tax-related non-audit fees, regardless of recurring nature.
For instance, tax-related non-audit fees deflated by total fees (TAX), TAX_REC and
TAX_NREC are all significantly higher for politically connected firms compared to
non-politically connected firms. In addition, politically connected firms have a
significantly higher proportion of Bumiputra directors on the board, significantly
higher institutional ownership, and a significantly lower proportion of family
members on the board. These results are consistent with prior studies (Abdul Wahab
et al., 2009, 2013; Gul, 2006). We also find that politically connected firms have a
significantly lower percentage of internal audit function outsourcing and a
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significantly lower proportion of independent directors on the audit committee.
Politically connected firms are significantly larger in size, have greater debt to equity
and are less likely to report a loss than non-politically connected firms.
Table 11 presents regression models when the sample is partitioned between
politically connected and non-politically connected firms. Columns 1 and 3 show
significant and negative relationships between the likelihood of financial restatements
and NAF (-0.630, z=-1.364, p<0.10) and TAX (-1.615, z=-1.531, p<0.10) for
politically connected firms; whereas, columns 2 and 4 show significant and negative
relationships between the likelihood of financial restatements and NAF (-0.933, z=-
1.750, p<0.05) and AUDREL (-1.960, z=-1.692, p<0.10) for non-politically
connected firms. Thus, Table 11 presents additional evidence beyond that reported in
Table 9 in that tax-related NAS reduces the likelihood of restatements for politically
connected firms, whereas audit-related NAS reduces the likelihood of restatements for
non-politically connected firms.
     Additionally for Table 11, recurring non-audit fees (NAF_REC) and recurring tax-
related non-audit fees (TAX_REC) in columns 5 and 7, respectively, are significantly
and negatively related to financial restatements for politically connected firms; and
recurring non-audit fees (NAF_REC) and recurring audit-related non-audit fees
(AUDREL_REC) in columns 6 and 8, respectively, are significantly and negatively
related to financial restatements for non-politically connected firms. This suggests that
certain recurring NAS purchased by politically and non-politically connected firms
result in knowledge spillover that improves audit and financial reporting quality.
Overall, these results highlight the importance of being able to distinguish different
types of NAS and their recurrence when examining auditor independence. The
proportion of independent directors on the audit committee (AUDCOM) represents the
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only corporate governance factor that significantly decreases the likelihood of
restatements for politically connected firms. With respect to control variables, LOSS is




This study examines the relationship between NAS and the likelihood of financial
restatements in Malaysia. Two important characteristics of NAS are taken into
account: types of NAS and whether these services are recurring. Evidence is provided
that non-audit fees are negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of
financial restatements. When non-audit fees are partitioned into components, there is a
negative and significant relationship between the likelihood of financial restatements
for both tax-related and audit-related non-audit fees. This supports the argument that
different types of NAS provide knowledge spillover that enhances audit and financial
reporting quality.
In  examining  the  effect  of  recurrence  of  the  different  types  of  NAS,  we find
that recurring (as opposed to non-recurring) tax-related and audit-related NAS are
negatively and significantly related to the incidence of financial statement
restatements. Thus, different types of NAS as well as their recurring nature influence
audit effectiveness.
In fulfilling the concern raised by Francis (2006) about controlling for
institutional settings, four institutional variables are considered in this study: political
connections, family firms, proportion of Bumiputra directors and institutional
ownership. We find a positive relationship between politically connected firms and
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financial restatements, which suggests that connected firms do carry more risk, as
argued by Gul (2006), and are operationally inefficient (Johnson & Mitton, 2003).
The analysis is then extended by separating the sample into politically connected and
non-politically connected firms. We find that non-audit fees, tax-related non-audit
fees, recurring non-audit fees and recurring tax-related non-audit fees are significantly
and negatively related to financial restatements for politically connected firms. We
also find that non-audit fees, audit-related non-audit fees, recurring non-audit fees and
recurring audit-related non-audit fees are significantly and negatively related to
restatements for non-politically connected firms. These findings suggest that specific
NAS purchased by politically connected firms (i.e., tax-related and recurring tax-
related) and non-politically connected firms (i.e., audit-related and recurring audit-
related) provide knowledge spillover that improves audit and financial reporting
quality.
           In the spirit of the extant literature on financial restatements, three corporate
governance variables are considered. We find that firms with a higher proportion of
independent directors on the audit committee have a lower likelihood of financial
restatements. In separate analyses of the proportion of independent directors on the
audit committee of politically connected firms versus non-politically connected firms,
the increased proportion of independent directors reduces the likelihood of financial
restatements for politically connected firms but not for non-politically connected
firms. This is an interesting finding since politically connected firms are significantly
more likely to have financial restatements than non-politically connected firms in
Malaysia.
         One limitation of this study is that the recurring nature of NAS is determined
over a narrow window of three years. A wider window would likely reduce any
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measurement error. The use of only one measure of financial reporting and audit
quality (i.e., financial restatements) may be viewed as another limitation because there
are many other proxies such as abnormal accruals and the auditor’s propensity to
qualify audit opinions. The use of multiple proxies for auditor independence could
serve as an additional test of robustness, while yielding further insights not possible
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Table 1: Sample Selection (2007-2009, n=953)









Note:  Non-incumbent auditors are auditors who provide NAS,
but do not provide statutory auditing to existing clients.	 	
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Table 2: Operational Definition of Variables
# Variables Definitions Source(s)
1 RESTATE An indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 if the firm restates the
financial statements for the fiscal
year, zero otherwise
Datastream
Panel A: Independent Test Variables
2 NAF Non-audit fees deflated by total fees Hand collected
3 TAX Tax related non-audit fees deflated
by total fees
Hand collected
4 AUDREL Audit related non-audit fees deflated
by total fees
Hand collected
5 OTHERS Other services non-audit fees
deflated by total fees
Hand collected
6 NAF_REC Recurring non-audit fees deflated by
total fees
Hand collected
7 NAF_NREC Non-recurring non-audit fees
deflated by total fees
Hand collected
8 TAX_REC Recurring tax related non-audit fees
deflated by total fees
Hand collected
9 TAX_NREC Non-recurring tax related non-audit
fees deflated by total fees
Hand collected
10 AUDREL_REC Recurring Audit-related non-audit
fees deflated by total fees
Hand collected
11 AUDREL_NREC Non-Recurring Audit-related non-
audit fees deflated by total fees
Hand collected
10 OTHERS_REC Recurring other services non-audit
fees deflated by total fees
Hand collected
11 OTHERS_NREC Non-recurring other services non-
audit fees deflated by total fees
Hand collected
Panel B: Independent Institutional Variables
12 BUMI Proportion of Bumiputra directors
on board of directors
Hand collected
13 INSTOWN % ownership by top 5 institutional
investors
Hand collected
14 POLCON An indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 if the firm is politically-
connected, zero otherwise
Johnson and Mitton (2003)
and Khazanah Bhd website.
15 FAMILY The proportion of family members
on the board of directors
Hand collected
Panel C: Independent Corporate Governance Variables
16 INT_AUDIT An indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 if the firm outsources its
internal audit function, zero
otherwise
Hand collected
17 AUDCOM The proportion of independent
directors on the audit committee
Hand collected
18 BOD_EXPERT The proportion of accounting and
finance expertise on board of
directors
Hand collected
Panel D: Independent Control Variables




14 DEBT_EQUITY Total debt deflated by total equity Compustat Global, missing
data hand collected
15 NEG_EQUITY An indicator variable that takes the
value  of  1  if  the  firm  recorded  a




18 LOSS An indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 if the firm records a loss
during the year, zero otherwise
Compustat Global, missing
data hand collected
20 BIG_4 An indicator variable that takes on
the value of 1 if the auditor is a Big
4 auditor, zero otherwise
Hand collected
Hand collected means hand collected from annual reports.
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Table 3: Distribution of Financial Restatements (2007-2009, n=953)
2007 Year (%)  Restate (%) 2008 Year (%) Restate (%) 2009 Year (%) Restate (%) Total (%) Total (%)
Restatements 38 8.68 38.78 7 2.35 7.14 53 24.42 54.08 100.00 98 10.28
Non-restatements 400 91.32 46.78 291 97.65 34.04 164 75.58 19.18 100.00 855 89.72
\
438 45.96 298 31.27 217 22.77 953 100.00
Table 3a: Distribution of Types of Restatements (2007-2009, n=98)
Types of Restatements 2007 Year (%) Types (%) 2008 Year (%) Types (%) 2009 Year (%) Types (%) Total (%) Total (%)
Restate_AR 7 18.42 23.33 2 28.57 6.67 21 39.62 70.00 100.00 30 30.61
Restate_1 7 18.42 41.18 4 57.14 23.53 6 11.32 35.29 100.00 17 17.35
Restate_M 24 63.16 47.06 1 14.29 1.96 26 49.06 50.98 100.00 51 52.04
38 100.00 7 100.00 53 100.00 98 100.00




Table 4: Differences in Variable Mean and Median between Restatement and Non-restatement
Firms (2007-2009, n=953)
Restate=1 (n=98) Restate=0 (n=855) t-test
Mann-
Whitney
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median p-value p-value
Panel A: Independent Test Variables
NAF_RM 68121.255 18725.000 171971.800 25000.000 0.186 0.123
AF_RM 231047.112 120850.000 330857.195 120000.000 0.374 0.861
TF_RM 299168.367 157040.000 502828.995 162384.000 0.207 0.661
TAX_RM 4195.929 0.000 59877.959 0.000 0.322 0.750
AUDREL_RM 36743.418 0.000 52657.411 0.000 0.680 0.101
OTHERS _RM 27181.908 5250.000 59436.430 3000.000 0.419 0.197
NAF_REC_RM 55553.245 10000.000 130825.126 10000.000 0.289 0.880
NAF_NREC_RM 12568.010 0.000 41146.674 0.000 0.292 0.229
TAX_REC_RM 2005.796 0.000 55529.242 0.000 0.339 0.554
TAX_NREC_RM 2190.133 0.000 4348.717 0.000 0.661 0.764
AUDREL_REC_RM 32308.908 0.000 26129.026 0.000 0.812 0.523
AUDREL_NREC_RM 4434.510 0.000 26528.385 0.000 0.411 0.403
OTHERS_REC_RM 21238.541 2500.000 49166.858 0.000 0.485 0.044
OTHERS_NREC_RM 5943.367 0.000 10269.572 0.000 0.450 0.535
TAX 0.015 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.183 0.753
AUDREL 0.058 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.141 0.114
OTHERS 0.104 0.053 0.110 0.017 0.684 0.254
NAF_REC 0.131 0.085 0.149 0.080 0.295 0.994
NAF_NREC 0.045 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.096 0.203
TAX_REC 0.010 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.206 0.561
TAX_NREC 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.678 0.765
AUDREL_REC 0.039 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.354 0.501
AUDREL_NREC 0.019 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.298 0.386
OTHERS_REC 0.082 0.017 0.077 0.000 0.703 0.048
OTHERS_NREC 0.021 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.270 0.538
Panel B: Independent Institutional Variables
BUMI 0.416 0.423 0.423 0.429 0.697 0.565
INSTOWN 10.294 4.497 10.319 3.333 0.915 0.579
POLCON 0.541 1.000 0.425 0.000 (0.049)
FAMILY 0.190 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.100 0.284
Panel C: Independent Corporate Governance Variables
INT_AUDIT 0.490 0.000 0.502 1.000 (0.913)
AUDCOM 0.803 0.750 0.804 0.750 0.914 0.795
BOD_EXPERT 0.266 0.222 0.273 0.250 0.617 0.725
Panel D: Independent Control Variables
TOTAL_ASSETS (‘000) 9360000 2890000 13800000 2500000 0.393 0.637
ASSETS 19.728 19.483 19.651 19.434 0.635 0.637
DEBT_EQUITY 0.932 0.623 0.835 0.603 0.372 0.263
NEG_EQUITY 0.020 0.000 0.034 0.000 (0.639)
LOSS 0.235 0.000 0.168 0.000 (0.279)
BIG_4 0.704 1.000 0.685 1.000 (0.766)
T-test of mean difference; Mann-Whitney is test of median difference.
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Restate takes the value of 1 if the firm restates the financial statements, zero otherwise. NAF_RM is non-audit fees. AF_RM is audit fees while
TF_RM is total fees. TAX_RM, AUDREL_RM and OTHERS_RM are tax-related, audit related and other services non-audit fees respectively.
NAF_REC_RM and NAF_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees respectively. TAX_REC_RM and TAX_NREC_RM are
recurring and non-recurring tax-related non-audit fees respectively. AUDREL_REC_RM and AUDREL_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring
audit related non-audit fees respectively. OTHERS_REC_RM and OTHERS_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring other services non-audit
fees, respectively. TAX, AUDREL and OTHERS are tax-related, audit-related and other services non-audit fees deflated by total fees. NAF_REC and
NAF_NREC are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees deflated by total fees respectively. TAX_REC and TAX_NREC are recurring and non-
recurring tax-related non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. AUDREL_REC and AUDREL_NREC are recurring and non-recurring audit-
related non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. OTHERS_REC and OTHERS_NREC are recurring and non-recurring other services non-
audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. BUMI is proportion of Bumiputras directors on the board. INSTOWN is percentage of ownership by top
5 institutional investors. POLCON is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected, zero otherwise. FAMILY is the
proportion of family members on the board of directors. . INT_AUDIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm outsources itsr
internal audit function, zero otherwise. AUDCOM is proportion of independent directors on audit committee. BOD_EXPERT is the proportion of
finance and accounting expertise on the board of directors. ASSETS is the natural log transformation of TOTAL_ASSETS. DEBT_EQUITY is total
debt deflated by total equity. NEG_EQUITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a negative equity, zero otherwise.
LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a loss during the year, zero otherwise.  BIG_4 takes on the value of 1 if the
firm is audited by a BIG 4 auditing firm, zero otherwise. Significant p-values are bold. X2 results are in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Differences in Mean and Median of Variables for Different Types of Financial Restatements (2007-2009, n=953)
	
Restate AR (n=30) Restate M (n=51) Restate I (n=17) Anova Kruskal Wallis
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median p-value p-value
Panel A: Independent Test Variables
NAF_RM 52560.500 16000.000 81246.275 22000.000 56206.353 14500.000 0.621 0.444
AF_RM 270711.367 123050.000 199812.627 117881.000 254754.824 149000.000 0.829 0.653
TF_RM 323271.867 149040.000 281058.902 138200.000 310961.176 178300.000 0.658 0.705
TAX_RM 1769.333 0.000 2986.529 0.000 12106.353 0.000 0.806 0.699
AUDREL_RM 12694.100 0.000 60882.980 0.000 6764.706 0.000 0.877 0.110
OTHERS _RM 38097.067 6000.000 17376.765 4000.000 37335.294 10500.000 0.866 0.266
NAF_REC_RM 45360.500 9000.000 74609.863 10250.000 16370.588 10000.000 0.757 0.572
NAF_NREC_RM 7200.000 0.000 6636.412 0.000 39835.765 0.000 0.720 0.140
TAX_REC_RM 1769.333 0.000 2813.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.822 0.511
TAX_NREC_RM 0.000 0.000 173.039 0.000 12106.353 0.000 0.871 0.051
AUDREL_REC_RM 5960.767 0.000 56322.549 0.000 6764.706 0.000 0.789 0.619
AUDREL_NREC_RM 6733.333 0.000 4560.431 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.877 0.293
OTHERS_REC_RM 37630.400 4000.000 15473.824 0.000 9605.882 8000.000 0.902 0.078
OTHERS_NREC_RM 466.667 0.000 1902.941 0.000 27729.412 0.000 0.308 0.250
TAX 0.011 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.610 0.731
AUDREL 0.050 0.000 0.075 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.269 0.097
OTHERS 0.110 0.059 0.094 0.037 0.120 0.089 0.913 0.393
NAF_REC 0.145 0.101 0.144 0.086 0.067 0.045 0.289 0.327
NAF_NREC 0.026 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.178 0.135
TAX_REC 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.617 0.523
TAX_NREC 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.668 0.054
AUDREL_REC 0.027 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.543 0.608
AUDREL_NREC 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.627 0.285
OTHERS_REC 0.107 0.044 0.080 0.000 0.046 0.031 0.539 0.084
OTHERS_NREC 0.003 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.104 0.238
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Restate AR (n=30) Restate M (n=51) Restate I (n=17) Anova Kruskal Wallis
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median p-value p-value
Panel B: Independent Institutional Variables
BUMI 0.412 0.429 0.433 0.417 0.375 0.400 0.587 0.750
INSTOWN 7.764 1.557 10.487 3.296 14.183 14.731 0.539 0.159
POLCON 0.433 0.000 0.627 1.000 0.471 0.000 (0.098)
FAMILY 0.194 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.393 0.760
Panel C: Independent Corporate Governance Variables
INT_AUDIT 0.600 1.000 0.490 0.000 0.294 0.000 (0.383)
AUDCOM 0.822 0.750 0.786 0.667 0.819 0.750 0.748 0.601
BOD_EXPERT 0.241 0.222 0.280 0.250 0.269 0.222 0.667 0.811
Panel D: Independent Control Variables
TOTAL_ASSETS(‘000) 9303000 2899000 7664000 2571000 14570000 3720000 0.805 0.768
ASSETS 19.791 19.485 19.579 19.365 20.064 19.734 0.636 0.768
DEBT_EQUITY 0.849 0.522 0.995 0.689 0.885 1.065 0.788 0.443
NEG_EQUITY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.000 (0.109)
LOSS 0.200 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.235 0.000 (0.376)
BIG_4 0.700 1.000 0.686 1.000 0.765 1.000 (0.955)
Anova test of differences among means; Kruskal Wallis test of differences among medians.
Restate_AR is restatements due to accounting rules application failure; Restate_I is restatements due to accounting irregularities; and Restate_M is restatements due to misrepresentations.
NAF_RM is non-audit fees. AF_RM is audit fees while TF_RM is total fees. TAX_RM, AUDREL_RM and OTHERS_RM are tax-related, audit related and other services non-audit fees,
respectively. NAF_REC_RM and NAF_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees, respectively. TAX_REC_RM and TAX_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring tax-
related non-audit fees, respectively. AUDREL_REC_RM and AUDREL_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring audit related non-audit fees, respectively. OTHERS_REC_RM and
OTHERS_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring other services non-audit fees, respectively. TAX, AUDREL and OTHERS are tax-related, audit-related and other services non-audit fees
deflated by total fees. NAF_REC and NAF_NREC are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees deflated by total fees respectively. TAX_REC and TAX_NREC are recurring and non-recurring
tax-related non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. AUDREL_REC and AUDREL_NREC are recurring and non-recurring audit-related non-audit fees deflated by total fees,
respectively. OTHERS_REC and OTHERS_NREC are recurring and non-recurring other services non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. BUMI is proportion of Bumiputras directors
on the board. INSTOWN is percentage of ownership by top 5 institutional investors. POLCON is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected, zero otherwise.
FAMILY is the proportion of family members on the board of directors. . INT_AUDIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm outsources its internal audit function, zero
otherwise. AUDCOM is proportion of independent directors on audit committee. BOD_EXPERT is the proportion of finance and accounting expertise on the board of directors. ASSETS is
natural log transformation of TOTAL_ASSETS. DEBT_EQUITY is total debt deflated by total equity. NEG_EQUITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a
negative equity, zero otherwise. LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a loss during the year, zero otherwise.  BIG_4 takes on the value of 1 if the firm is
audited by a BIG 4 auditing firm, zero otherwise. Significant p-values are bold. X2 results are in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Correlations Matrix (2007-2009, n=953)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 RESTATE -0.064# -0.019 -0.060@ 0.041 -0.017 0.011 0.071# 0.036 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 0.016 0.029 -0.023 0.053 0.012
2 NAF -0.074# 0.210* 0.131* 0.232* 0.002 -0.038 0.012 -0.073# -0.019 -0.032 0.066# 0.078# -0.01 -0.003 -0.027 0.116*
3 TAX -0.04 0.324* -0.229* -0.298* -0.064 0.132* 0.112* -0.077# -0.046 -0.030 0.077# 0.101* -0.004 -0.012 -0.043 0.058@
4 AUDREL -0.049 0.421* -0.137* -0.737* 0.075# -0.138* -0.002 -0.019 0.028 0.071# -0.074# -0.074# -0.027 -0.011 -0.007 -0.241*
5 OTHERS -0.011 0.514* -0.171* -0.352* -0.026 0.028 -0.065# 0.036 -0.002 -0.065# 0.048 0.039 0.02 0.018 0.019 0.237*
6 BUMI -0.012 0.012 -0.037 0.015 0.024 0.028 0.091* -0.123* 0.006 -0.066# 0.028 -0.003 -0.052 0.043 -0.028 -0.052
7 INSTOWN -0.001 0.017 0.087* -0.026 -0.014 0.043 0.108* 0.095* -0.202* -0.016 0.048 0.189* 0.009 0.046 -0.073# 0.192*
8 POLCON 0.071# 0.025 0.096* 0.008 -0.042 0.152* 0.148* -0.083* -0.174* -0.034 0.022 0.174* 0.039 0.041 -0.055@ -0.05
9 FAMILY 0.049 -0.099* -0.083# -0.071 0.008 -0.132* 0.037 -0.079# 0.021 -0.026 -0.080# -0.076 -0.01 -0.023 0.007 0.005
10 INT_AUDIT -0.007 -0.042 -0.074# 0.004 -0.002 -0.044 -0.173* -0.174* 0.017 -0.05 -0.06 -0.347* -0.104* -0.042 0.085* -0.131*
11 AUDCOM -0.003 -0.023 -0.005 0.033 -0.051 -0.077# -0.029 -0.05 -0.011 -0.03 0.04 0.076# 0.012 0.011 0.025 0.018
12 BOD_EXPERT -0.014 0.100* 0.158* -0.02 0.026 -0.012 0.042 0.02 -0.056@ -0.058 0.034 0.025 0.089* 0.006 0.054@ 0.041
13 ASSETS 0.016 0.114* 0.140* -0.011 0.045 0.039 0.220* 0.171* -0.070# -0.315* 0.048 0.033 0.249* -0.159* -0.225* 0.270*
14 DEBT_EQUITY 0.022 0.022 0.041 0.016 -0.018 -0.038 -0.018 0.016 -0.021 -0.104* -0.002 0.076 0.238* -0.307* 0.126* 0.046
15 NEG_EQUITY -0.023 -0.001 -0.009 0.009 -0.003 0.054 0.021 0.041 -0.019 -0.042 -0.001 -0.001 -0.218* -0.497* 0.071# -0.017
16 LOSS 0.053 -0.015 -0.035 0.014 -0.005 -0.068 -0.073 -0.055 0.024 0.085* 0.036 0.057 -0.193* 0.088* 0.071# -0.100*
17 BIG_4 0.012 0.105* 0.097* -0.148* 0.187* -0.002 0.153** -0.05 0.004 -0.131* 0.008 0.05 0.223* 0.018 -0.017 -0.100*
Spearman-rank correlations are in the upper half of diagonal; Pearson correlations are in the lower half.
RESTATE takes the value of 1 if the firm restates the financial statements, zero otherwise.  NAF is non-audit fees deflated by total fees. TAX, AUDREL and OTHERS are tax-related, audit-related and other services non-audit fees deflated by total
fees, respectively. BUMI is proportion of Bumiputra directors on the board. INSTOWN is percentage ownership by top 5 institutional investors. POLCON is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected, zero
otherwise. FAMILY is the proportion of family members on the board of directors. INT_AUDIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm outsources its internal audit function, zero otherwise. AUDCOM is proportion of
independent directors on audit committee. BOD_EXPERT is the proportion of finance and accounting expertise on the board of directors. ASSETS is natural log transformation of total assets. DEBT_EQUITY is total debt deflated by total equity.
NEG_EQUITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a negative equity, zero otherwise. LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a loss during the year, zero otherwise. BIG_4 takes on the
value of 1 if the firm is audited by a BIG 4 auditing firm, zero otherwise. @, # and *denote significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% based on two-tailed test, respectively.
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Table 7: Univariate Analyses of Variables among Different Types of NAS (2007-2009, n=953)
Anova test of differences among means; Kruskal Wallis test of differences among medians.
TAX, AUDREL and OTHERS are tax-related, audit-related and other services non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively RESTATE takes the value of 1 if
the firm restates the financial statements, zero otherwise. NAF_RM is non-audit fees. AF_RM is audit fees while TF_RM is total fees.. NAF_REC_RM and
NAF_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees, respectively. NAF_REC and NAF_NREC are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees deflated
by total fees, respectively. BUMI is proportion of Bumiputras directors on the board. INSTOWN is percentage ownership by top 5 institutional investors. POLCON
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected, zero otherwise. FAMILY is the proportion of family members on the board of
directors.  INT_AUDIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm outsources its internal audit function, zero otherwise. AUDCOM is proportion of
independent directors on audit committee. BOD_EXPERT is the proportion of finance and accounting expertise on the board of directors. ASSETS is natural log
transformation of TOTAL_ASSETS. DEBT_EQUITY is total debt deflated by total equity. NEG_EQUITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
firm records a negative equity, zero otherwise. LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a loss during the year, zero otherwise.
BIG_4 takes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a BIG 4 auditing firm, zero otherwise. Significant p-values are bold. X2 results are in parenthesis.
	 	
(TAX (n=81)) (AUDREL (n=361)) (OTHERS (n=511)) Anova
Kruskal
Wallis
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median
p-
value p-value
Panel A :Independent Test Variables
RESTATE 0.086 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.121 0.000 (0.000)
NAF_RM 637121.679 80770.000 134689.587 22000.000 104661.400 20000.000 0.000 0.000
AF_RM 647164.593 178475.000 235600.662 118000.000 328871.500 113000.000 0.004 0.000
TF_RM 1284286.272 272054.000 370290.249 153219.000 433532.900 152500.000 0.000 0.000
NAF_REC_RM 588568.765 51634.000 70655.374 8000.000 86338.630 10000.000 0.000 0.000
NAF_NREC_RM 48552.914 0.000 64034.213 0.000 18322.770 0.000 0.034 0.177
NAF_REC 0.247 0.242 0.129 0.061 0.144 0.077 0.000 0.000
NAF_NREC 0.078 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.194 0.171
Panel B: Independent Institutional Variables
BUMI 0.394 0.400 0.430 0.429 0.421 0.400 0.181 0.022
INSTOWN 16.138 12.840 7.928 2.087 11.080 4.762 0.000 0.000
POLCON 0.617 1.000 0.438 0.000 0.407 0.000 (0.000)
FAMILY 0.103 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.042 0.112
Panel C: Independent Corporate Governance Variables
INT_AUDIT 0.432 0.000 0.515 1.000 0.501 1.000 (0.000)
AUDCOM 0.783 0.750 0.822 0.750 .0.795 0.750 0.016 0.031
BOD_EXPERT 0.314 0.250 0.257 0.222 0.276 0.250 0.004 0.007
Panel D: Independent Control Variables
TOTAL_ASSETS(‘000) 3528000 539500 1288000 250100 1020000 281000 0.000 0.001
ASSETS 20.279 20.106 19.524 19.337 19.656 19.453 0.000 0.001
DEBT_EQUITY 0.919 0.504 0.912 0.557 0.786 0.637 0.309 0.748
NEG_EQUITY 0.025 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.035 0.000 (0.000)
LOSS 0.123 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.188 0.000 (0.000)
BIG_4 0.765 1.000 0.529 1.000 0.787 1.000 (0.000)
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Table 8: Univariate Analysis for Recurring vs. Non-recurring Firms (2007-2009, n=953)
Recurring (n=669) Non-recurring  (n=284) t-test
Mann-
Whitney
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median p-value p-value
Panel A: Independent Test Variables
RESTATE 0.112 0.000 0.081 0.000 (0.529)
NAF_RM 175335.876 25000.000 128211.518 21125.000 0.112 0.400
AF_RM 360861.453 126300.000 225736.644 108000.000 0.071 0.005
TF_RM 536197.329 170233.000 353948.162 144760.000 0.017 0.023
TAX_RM 71261.689 0.000 13847.838 0.000 0.015 0.560
AUDREL_RM 38126.442 0.000 81395.602 0.000 0.145 0.032
OTHERS_RM 65947.744 4000.000 32968.077 0.000 0.075 0.049
TAX 0.030 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.242 0.569
AUDREL 0.070 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.145 0.013
OTHERS 0.110 0.029 0.106 0.000 0.075 0.158
Panel B: Independent Institutional Variables
BUMI 0.420 0.417 0.427 0.429 0.430 0.071
INSTOWN 9.898 2.738 11.300 5.607 0.180 0.005
POLCON 0.436 0.000 0.437 0.000 (0.970)
FAMILY 0.152 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.296 0.170
Panel C: Independent Corporate Governance Variables
INT_AUDIT 0.504 1.000 0.493 0.000 (0.747)
AUDCOM 0.808 0.750 0.795 0.750 0.333 0.377
BOD_EXPERT 0.275 0.250 0.265 0.222 0.409 0.132
Panel D: Independent Control Variables
TOTAL_ASSETS(‘000) 1502000 295500 940400 243100 0.024 0.138
ASSETS 19.700 19.504 19.563 19.309 0.222 0.138
DEBT_EQUITY 0.848 0.605 0.837 0.611 0.944 0.779
NEG_EQUITY 0.034 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.618 0.751
LOSS 0.190 0.000 0.141 0.000 (0.063)
BIG_4 0.695 1.000 0.669 1.000 (0.972)
RESTATE takes the value of 1 if the firm restates the financial statements, zero otherwise. NAF_RM is non-audit fees. AF_RM is audit fees
while TF_RM is total fees. TAX_RM, AUDREL_RM and OTHERS_RM are tax-related, audit related and other services non-audit fees,
respectively. TAX, AUDREL and OTHERS are tax-related, audit-related and other services non-audit fees deflated by total fees,
respectively.  BUMI is proportion of Bumiputras directors on the board. INSTOWN is percentage ownership by top 5 institutional investors.
POLCON is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected, zero otherwise. FAMILY is the proportion of
family members on the board of directors.  INT_AUDIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm outsources its internal
audit function, zero otherwise. AUDCOM is proportion of independent directors on audit committee. BOD_EXPERT is the proportion of
finance and accounting expertise on the board of directors. ASSETS is natural log transformation of TOTAL_ASSETS. DEBT_EQUITY is
total debt deflated by total equity.  NEG_EQUITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a negative equity, zero
otherwise LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a loss during the year,zero otherwise.  BIG_4 takes on the





Table 9: Main Regression Results (2007-2009, n=953)
Variable Expected Coefficient Coefficient
Direction 1 2










BUMI + -0.214 -0.224
-0.573 -0.601
INSTOWN - -0.001 -0.001
-0.335 -0.266
POLCON + 0.265 0.277
2.124** 2.218**
FAMILY - 0.335 0.314
1.262 1.172
INT_AUDIT - -0.054 -0.056
-0.409 -0.419
AUDCOM - -0.007 -0.007
-1.785** -1.746**
BOD_EXPERT - -0.342 -0.354
-0.809 -0.833
ASSETS + 0.019 0.023
0.413 0.501
DEBT_EQUITY + -0.009 -0.008
-0.195 -0.172
NEG_EQUITY + -0.321 -0.320
-0.740 -0.734
LOSS + 0.262 0.256
1.755** 1.710**
BIG_4 - 0.105 0.086
0.782 0.619
Period and Industry Dummies Included Included
McFadden R2 0.133 0.136
LR statistic 84.160*** 85.702***
Obs with Dep=0 855 855
Obs with Dep=1 98 98
 First value in table is coefficient and second value is z-statistic.
Dep is RESTATE dependent variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm restates the financial statements, zero otherwise.  NAF is
non-audit fees deflated by total fees. TAX, AUDREL and OTHERS are tax-related, audit-related and other services non-audit fees
deflated by total fees, respectively. BUMI is proportion of Bumiputra directors on the board. INSTOWN is percentage ownership by
top 5 institutional investors. POLCON is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected, zero
otherwise. FAMILY is the proportion of family members on the board of directors. INT_AUDIT is an indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 if the firm outsources its internal audit function, zero otherwise. AUDCOM is proportion of independent directors on audit
committee. BOD_EXPERT is the proportion of finance and accounting expertise on the board of directors. ASSETS is natural log
transformation of total assets. DEBT_EQUITY is total debt deflated by total equity. NEG_EQUITY is an indicator variable that takes
the value of 1 if the firm records a negative equity, zero otherwise. LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm
records a loss during the year, zero otherwise. BIG_4 takes on the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a BIG 4 auditing firm, zero
otherwise. *, ** and *** denote significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% based on one-tailed test, respectively.
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Table 10: Regressions on Types of Recurring and Non-recurring NAS (2007-2009, n=953)
Variable Expected Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Direction 1 2 3 4 5
INTERCEPT ? -0.403 -0.473 -0.430 -0.387 -0.521





TAX_REC - -1.443 -1.779
-1.453* -1.674**
TAX_NREC - 0.155 -0.175
0.172 -0.189
AUDREL_REC - -0.674 -0.957
-1.126 -1.512*
AUDREL_NREC - -0.388 -0.649
-0.559 -0.876
OTHERS_REC - 0.067 -0.357
0.173 -0.804
OTHERS_NREC - -0.252 -0.646
-0.433 -1.043
BUMI + -0.210 -0.209 -0.199 -0.210 -0.219
-0.563 -0.554 -0.535 -0.560 -0.590
INSTOWN - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-0.343 -0.143 -0.327 -0.227 -0.332
POLCON + 0.264 0.272 0.261 0.261 0.281
2.115** 2.170** 2.101** 2.093** 2.259**
FAMILY - 0.336 0.335 0.319 0.342 0.309
1.264* 1.258 1.201 1.286* 1.157
INT_AUDIT - -0.055 -0.061 -0.053 -0.057 -0.058
-0.414 -0.457 -0.402 -0.427 -0.437
AUDCOM - -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
-1.785** -1.640** -1.615* -1.645** -1.673**
BOD_EXPERT - -0.340 -0.376 -0.447 -0.426 -0.350
-0.806 -0.879 -1.060 -1.010 -0.822
ASSETS + 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.011 0.025
0.416 0.357 0.343 0.245 0.530
DEBT_EQUITY + -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009
-0.190 -0.238 -0.178 -0.215 -0.201
NEG_EQUITY + -0.322 -0.336 -0.316 -0.314 -0.326
-0.743 -0.768 -0.722 -0.723 -0.743
LOSS + 0.263 0.259 0.252 0.256 0.258
1.757** 1.738** 1.687** 1.719** 1.720**
BIG_4 - 0.107 0.087 0.051 0.073 0.083
0.802 0.637 0.366 0.531 0.598
Period and Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included
McFadden R2 0.133 0.132 0.130 0.128 0.138
LR statistic 84.221*** 83.469*** 82.177*** 80.639*** 86.884***
Obs with Dep=0 855 855 855 855 855
Obs with Dep=1 98 98 98 98 98
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First value in table is coefficient and second value is z-statistic.
Dep is RESTATE dependent variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm restates the financial statements, zero otherwise.
NAF_REC and NAF_NREC are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. TAX_REC and
TAX_NREC are recurring and non-recurring tax-related non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. AUDREL_REC and
AUDREL_NREC are recurring and non-recurring audit-related non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. OTHERS_REC
and OTHERS_NREC are recurring and non-recurring other services non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. BUMI is
proportion of Bumiputra directors on the board. INSTOWN is percentage ownership by top 5 institutional investors. POLCON is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected, zero otherwise. FAMILY is the proportion of family
members on the board of directors. INT_AUDIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm outsources its internal
audit function, zero otherwise. AUDCOM is proportion of independent directors on audit committee. BOD_EXPERT is the
proportion of finance and accounting expertise on the board of directors.  ASSETS is natural log transformation of total assets.
DEBT_EQUITY is total debt deflated by total equity. NEG_EQUITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm
records a negative equity, zero otherwise. LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a loss during the
year, zero otherwise. BIG_4 takes on the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a BIG 4 auditing firm, zero otherwise. *, **, and ***
denote significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% based on one-tailed test respectively.
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Table 11: Regressions – Politically Connected Firms vs. Non-Politically Connected Firms (2007-2009, n-953)
Dependent Variable=RESTATE (1, 0)
	
Variable Expected Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Direction Polcon=1 Polcon=0 Polcon=1 Polcon=0 Polcon=1 Polcon=0 Polcon=1 Polcon=0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
INTERCEPT ? -0.626 0.503 -0.639 0.588 -0.713 0.428 -0.609 0.769
-0.498 0.255 -0.499 0.275 -0.557 0.220 -0.465 0.395
NAF - -0.630 -0.933
-1.364* -1.750**
TAX - -1.615 -0.931
-1.531* -0.923
AUDREL - -0.319 -1.960
-0.513 -1.692*
OTHERS - -0.626 -0.446
-1.161 -0.809
NAF_REC - -0.815 -0.825
-1.489* -1.553*
NAF_NREC - -0.346 -1.267
-0.596 -1.228
TAX_REC - -2.031 -1.457
-1.448* -1.053
TAX_NREC - -0.507 0.650
-0.470 0.340
AUDREL_REC - -0.187 -2.985
-0.239 -2.662**
AUDREL_NREC - -0.570 -1.050
-0.644 -0.744
OTHERS_REC - -0.960 -0.180
-1.524* -0.316
OTHERS_NREC - -0.181 -2.488
-0.246 -2.100**
BUMI + -0.084 -0.410 -0.062 -0.389 -0.048 -0.399 0.012 -0.391
-0.192 -0.627 -0.140 -0.602 -0.109 -0.609 0.027 -0.602
INSTOWN - -0.009 0.007 -0.008 0.006 -0.009 0.007 -0.008 0.004
-1.374* 1.163 -1.308* 1.003 -1.403* 1.174 -1.214 0.723
FAMILY - 0.417 0.299 0.405 0.224 0.420 0.294 0.411 0.177





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
INT_AUDIT - -0.097 -0.010 -0.102 -0.018 -0.101 -0.008 -0.105 -0.045
-0.482 -0.055 -0.504 -0.095 -0.498 -0.043 -0.515 -0.243
AUDCOM - -0.011 -0.006 -0.011 -0.006 -0.010 -0.006 -0.011 -0.005
-1.765** -1.127 -1.788** -1.046 -1.726** -1.086 -1.786** -0.879
BOD_EXPERT - -0.435 -0.413 -0.422 -0.528 -0.429 -0.417 -0.414 -0.585
-0.777 -0.666 -0.756 -0.816 -0.772 -0.674 -0.746 -0.914
ASSETS + 0.062 -0.028 0.064 -0.030 0.065 -0.025 0.062 -0.038
1.155 -0.290 1.158 -0.296 1.192 -0.267 1.104 -0.405
DEBT_EQUITY + -0.027 0.014 -0.027 0.012 -0.027 0.013 -0.037 0.014
-0.421 0.223 -0.416 0.190 -0.417 0.207 -0.577 0.209
NEG_EQUITY + -0.531 0.067 -0.523 0.037 -0.532 0.081 -0.592 0.197
-0.835 0.114 -0.818 0.063 -0.832 0.140 -0.924 0.339
LOSS + 0.357 0.154 0.359 0.152 0.365 0.154 0.376 0.144
1.653* 0.741 1.678** 0.711 1.697** 0.743 1.755** 0.662
BIG_4 - 0.178 -0.002 0.202 -0.056 0.182 -0.009 0.211 -0.088
0.906 -0.008 0.981 -0.281 0.928 -0.049 1.014 -0.440
Period and Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
McFadden R2 0.148 0.135 0.153 0.146 0.150 0.136 0.157 0.160
LR statistic 47.115*** 41.853*** 48.657*** 45.014*** 47.566*** 42.103*** 49.868*** 49.552***
Obs with Dep=0 363 492 363 492 363 492 363 492
Obs with Dep=1 53 45 53 45 53 45 53 45
First value in table is variable coefficient and second value is z-statistic.
RESTATE takes the value of 1 if the firm restates the financial statements, zero otherwise. Polcon is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically
connected, zero otherwise. NAF is non-audit fees deflated by total fees. TAX, AUDREL and OTHERS are tax-related, audit-related and other services non-audit fees deflated by
total fees, respectively. NAF_REC and NAF_NREC are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. TAX_REC and TAX_NREC are recurring
and non-recurring tax-related non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. AUDREL_REC and AUDREL_NREC are recurring and non-recurring audit-related non-audit
fees deflated by total fees, respectively. OTHERS_REC and OTHERS_NREC are recurring and non-recurring other services non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. .
BUMI is proportion of Bumiputra directors on the board. INSTOWN is percentage ownership by top 5 institutional investors.  FAMILY is the proportion of family members on
the board of directors. INT_AUDIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm outsources its internal audit function, zero otherwise. AUDCOM is proportion of
independent directors on audit committee.  BOD_EXPERT is the proportion of finance and accounting expertise on the board of directors.  ASSETS is natural log transformation
of total assets. DEBT_EQUITY is total debt deflated by total equity.  NEG_EQUITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a negative equity, zero
otherwise. LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a loss during the year, zero otherwise.  BIG_4 takes on the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a
BIG 4 auditing firm, zero otherwise..*, **, and *** denote significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% based on one-tailed test, respectively.
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Appendix A: Differences in Variables Mean and Median between Politically and non-Politically Connected
Firms (2007-2009, n=953)
(Polcon=1 n=416) (Polcon=0 n=537) t-test Mann-Whitney
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median p-value p-value
Panel A: Test Variables
RESTATE 0.127 0.000 0.084 0.000 (0.014)
NAF_RM 223836.382 25700.000 112841.410 23000.000 0.201 0.030
AF_RM 478330.474 137500.000 198398.588 112000.000 0.000 0.000
TF_RM 702166.856 186300.000 311239.998 145309.000 0.003 0.000
TAX_RM 52601.846 0.000 55352.864 0.000 0.360 0.001
AUDREL_RM 88095.450 0.000 22300.250 0.000 0.009 0.631
OTHERS_RM 83139.087 300.000 35188.296 4000.000 0.079 0.074
NAF_REC_RM 166208.803 10000.000 89677.540 10000.000 0.494 0.220
NAF_NREC_RM 57627.579 0.000 23163.870 0.000 0.053 0.868
TAX_REC_RM 44122.200 0.000 54598.203 0.000 0.258 0.004
TAX_NREC_RM 8479.647 0.000 754.661 0.000 0.042 0.078
AUDREL_REC_RM 48235.067 0.000 10131.847 0.000 0.037 0.600
AUDREL_NREC_RM 39860.382 0.000 12168.402 0.000 0.115 0.853
OTHERS_REC_RM 73851.536 0.000 24947.490 0.000 0.069 0.153
OTHERS_NREC_RM 9287.550 0.000 10240.806 0.000 0.683 0.541
TAX 0.039 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.013 0.001
AUDREL 0.080 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.746 0.958
OTHERS 0.101 0.003 0.115 0.039 0.134 0.031
NAF_REC 0.149 0.079 0.146 0.081 0.952 0.899
NAF_NREC 0.072 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.593 0.982
TAX_REC 0.029 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.093 0.005
TAX_NREC 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.044 0.081
AUDREL_REC 0.050 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.855 0.770
AUDREL_NREC 0.031 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.800 0.798
OTHERS_ REC 0.070 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.187 0.080
OTHERS_NREC 0.031 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.584 0.556
Panel B: Institutional Variables
BUMI 0.449 0.429 0.401 0.429 0.000 0.006
INSTOWN 12.751 5.969 8.430 2.763 0.000 0.000
FAMILY 0.346 0.000 0.412 0.000 0.024 0.019
Panel C: Corporate Governance Variables
INT_AUDIT 0.401 0.000 0.577 1.000 (0.000)
AUDCOM 0.795 0.750 0.811 0.750 0.087 0.229
BOD_EXPERT 0.275 0.250 0.269 0.250 0.667 0.663
Panel C: Control Variables
TOTAL_ASSETS(‘000) 1992000 373600 825100 227000 0.001 0.000
ASSETS 19.944 19.739 19.439 19.240 0.000 0.000
DEBT_EQUITY 0.869 0.661 0.826 0.557 0.344 0.089
NEG_EQUITY 0.041 0.000 0.026 0.000 (0.658)
LOSS 0.151 0.000 0.194 0.000 (0.088)
BIG_4 0.661 1.000 0.708 1.000 (0.974)
T-test of mean difference; Mann-Whitney is test of median difference.
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Polcon is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected, zero otherwise. RESTATE takes the value of 1 if the
firm restates the financial statements, zero otherwise. NAF_RM is non-audit fees. AF_RM is audit fees while TF_RM is total fees. TAX_RM,
AUDREL_RM and OTHERS_RM are tax-related, audit-related and other services non-audit fees, respectively. NAF_REC_RM and
NAF_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees, respectively. TAX_REC_RM and TAX_NREC_RM are recurring and non-
recurring tax-related non-audit fees, respectively. AUDREL_REC_RM and AUDREL_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring audit-related
non-audit fees, respectively. OTHERS_REC_RM and OTHERS_NREC_RM are recurring and non-recurring other services non-audit fees,
respectively. TAX, AUDREL and OTHERS are tax-related, audit-related and other services non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively.
NAF_REC and NAF_NREC are recurring and non-recurring non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. TAX_REC and TAX_NREC are
recurring and non-recurring tax-related non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. AUDREL_REC and AUDREL_NREC are recurring
and non-recurring audit-related non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. OTHERS_REC and OTHERS_NREC are recurring and non-
recurring other services non-audit fees deflated by total fees, respectively. BUMI is proportion of Bumiputras directors on the board. INSTOWN
is percentage ownership by top 5 institutional investors. FAMILY is the proportion of family members on the board of directors.  INT_AUDIT
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm outsources its internal audit function, zero otherwise. AUDCOM is proportion of
independent directors on audit committee. BOD_EXPERT is the proportion of finance and accounting expertise on the board of directors.
ASSETS is natural log transformation of TOTAL_ASSETS. DEBT_EQUITY is total debt deflated by total equity. NEG_EQUITY is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm records a negative equity, zero otherwise.  LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 if the firm records a loss during the year, zero otherwise.  BIG_4 takes on the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a BIG 4 auditing





Appendix B: Examples of Financial Restatements
FIRM NOTE FROM  THE ANNUAL REPORT TYPES OF
RESTATEMENT
A  &M  Realty  Bhd.
2007
The earnings per share and gross dividend per share have been
restated after taking into consideration the adjustment for bonus
issue  on  the  basis  of  one  (1)  new  share  for  every  one  (1)  existing
share, and share subdivision into two (2) shares of RM 0.50 each for




2009 Certain comparative figures have been reclassified to conform to
current year’s financial presentation.
Misrepresentation
Ann Joo Bhd. 2009 A discontinued operation is a component of the Group’s business that
represents a separate major line of business that is held for sale.
Classification as a discontinued operation occurs upon disposal or
when the operation meets the criteria to be classified as held for sale,
if earlier. When an operation is classified as a discontinued operation,
the comparative income statements are restated as if the operation
had been discontinued from the start of the comparative period.
Irregularity
